The ascending clock algorithm is used for yearly, quarterly, and monthly products.


General Information

Start price and total price of an auction



Submit a bid



  • After joining an auction and choosing a network point at which to book capacity, enter the quantity of the bid in the 'Amount' field under 'Active Bid'
  • The sum of all bids of one shipper must not exceed the available capacity
  • State the balancing group or portfolio code if required




Change a bid



  • All the bids a shipper has placed in an auction are shown at the top of the auction's page and on the recent activity dashboard
  • Every bid placed on the PRISMA platform can be edited or withdrawn as long as the bidding round is still open




Example 1: Clearance after first bidding round




  • In auctions a given amount of capacity is offered with predefined price steps
  • A bid can be placed for a certain amount of capacity at a given price
  • All auctions start at the regulated tariff (RT) in the first bidding round
  • If necessary additional price steps are applied in the following bidding rounds
  • If the sum of all placed bids in the first bidding round is lower (undersell) or equal to the available capacity the auction is closed after the first bidding round and the capacity is allocated according to the bids




Example 2: Oversell after first bidding round




  • If the sum of all placed bids in the first bidding round is higher as the available capacity (oversell) the auction continues with the next bidding round
  • A large price step is applied and bids can be placed for a certain amount at the new price P1 (regulated tariff plus large price step)
  • The amount of the bid has to be equal or lower to the bid in the previous bidding round




  • If the sum of all placed bids in the second bidding round is higher than the available capacity (oversell) the auction continues with the next bidding round
  • A large price step is applied and bids can be placed for a certain amount at the new price P2 (regulated tariff plus two large price steps)
  • The amount of the bid has to be equal or lower to the bid in the previous bidding round




  • If the sum of all placed bids in the bidding round is equal to the available capacity the auction closes and the capacity is allocated
  • The clearing price of the auction is P2 (Regulated Tariff + 2 large price steps)




Example 3: Undersell after third bidding round





  • If the sum of all placed bids in the bidding round is lower than the available capacity (undersell) the auction continues with the next bidding round
  • The undersell suggest that the price (regulated tariff + two large price steps) is too high, therefore the second large price step is revoked
  • Instead a small price step is applied in the next bidding round and bids can be placed for a certain amount at the new price P3 (regulated tariff plus one large and one small price step)
  • The amount of the bid has to be equal or lower to the bid in the second bidding round and equal or higher than in the third bidding round (at the same time)



  • If the sum of all placed bids in the bidding round is higher than the available capacity (oversell) the auction continues with the next bidding round
  • The second small price step is applied and bids can be placed for a certain amount at the new price P4 (regulated tariff plus one large and two small price steps)
  • The amount of the bid has to be equal or lower to the bid in the previous bidding round (in this case the fourth bidding round)






  • If the sum of all placed bids in the bidding round is higher than the available capacity (oversell) the auction continues with the next bidding round
  • The third small price step is applied and bids can be placed for a certain amount at the new price P5 (regulated tariff plus one large and three small price steps)
  • The amount of the bid has to be equal or lower to the bid in the previous bidding round (in this case the fifth bidding round)




  • If the sum of all placed bids in the bidding round is lower than the available capacity (undersell) the auction closes and the capacity is allocated
  • The clearing price of the auction is P5 (regulated tariff plus one large and three small price steps)




Example 4: Competing auctions (1:n auctions)

Introduction to competing auctions



  • To market bundled capacities two additional network points are created on the PRISMA platform
  • The additional network points use the master data of the underlying unbundled network points




Different capacity situations at bundles




Competing auctions


  • The two auctions at the bundle AB and AC take place in parallel on the PRISMA platform, according to the rules and procedures of a standard competing clock auction as described in the NC CAM
  • After each bidding round the results are analyzed and it is checked whether the competition constraint - available capacity at A (100) - is solved
  • In case the competition constraint is solved, the competition is removed and the auctions continue independently until the capacity is allocated





  • The aggregated demand of bundle AB and AC is bigger than the competition constraint (AB +AC > A)
  • The competition constraint is not solved, therefore the next bidding round is necessary
  • In the next bidding round the first large price step is applied to both auctions





  • The aggregated demand of bundle AB and AC is bigger than the competition constraint (AB +AC > A)
  • The competition constraint is not solved, therefore the next bidding round is necessary
  • In the next bidding round the second large price step is applied to both auctions




  • The aggregated demand of bundle AB and AC smaller than the competition constraint (AB + AC < A).
  • In order to solve the competition the auctions are split and continued independently from each other.
  • Since AB is still in oversell the marketable capacity for AB stays 40 whereas AC is restricted to 60 which is the remaining part of the competition constraint (100).




  • The auctions are continued independently from each other, the competition constraint is not relevant any more.
  • AB is in undersell, therefore the first small price step is applied in the next bidding round.
  • AC is in oversell, therefore the second small price step is applied In the next bidding round.




  • Both auctions are in undersell therefore the auctions are finished.
  • The capacity is allocated as follows: AB=39 (price P5) and AC=55 (Price P6).